


10-1179-166

19 MAR 1979



MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM :   
Director of Communications

SUBJECT : Background Paper - National Communications  
Directive

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is for your information only. Its purpose is to inform you of the background and current status of the National Communications Security Directive and of a potentially controversial issue associated with the directive.

2. Background:

a. From August 1968 to November 1977, national communications security policies were established and issued by the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB) with a membership similar, but not identical to the Intelligence Community. The DCI's principal representative on the Board was the Director of Communications.

b. In November 1977, the USCSB was disestablished by Presidential Directive/NSC-24 (Attachment 1) which also realigned the national management and policy review responsibilities for communications security as shown in Attachment 2.

c. In May 1978, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (ASDC<sup>3</sup>I), acting for the Executive Agent, circulated to the former USCSB members a draft Executive Agent COMSEC Directive which established organizational relationships and delegated functions within the government for the discharge of the responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for COMSEC.

d. A principal feature of the draft directive was the establishment of a National Security Communications Protection Committee (NSCPC) with a membership and mission very similar to the former USCSB. The singular difference was that the NSCPC only recommended policy to the Executive Agent for COMSEC, whereas the former USCSB established policy.

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e. In its critique of the draft (Attachment 3), and in subsequent meetings on the subject, CIA contended that national policy should be established by the committee based on a vote of the full membership. The Departments of State, Treasury, and Navy shared that position. That change and others were incorporated into the draft and a final draft (Attachment 4) was submitted to the DoD General Counsel some time around September 1978.

f. In the course of staffing out the final language of the draft directive, we provided the DCI with two information memoranda. His note on the memorandum of 3 August (Attachment 5) indicates that the DCI had reservation about our position on the issue of establishing policy versus recommending policy. No response was made to the DCI's note because none was called for and because we felt that the issue could be resolved to our satisfaction at the staff level without DCI intercession. On the 7 August memorandum (Attachment 6) the DCI indicated that he agreed with the ASDC<sup>3</sup>I statement that PD-24 clearly indicated that the Executive Agent would establish policy. Although we find no language in PD-24 which specifically supports the ASDC<sup>3</sup>I statement, we acknowledge that PD-24 imposes no restrictions on how the Executive Agent should carry out his responsibilities - he is left free to establish policies and procedures as he sees fit. We do not challenge the Executive Agent's authority to limit the committee to an advisory role, we only argue the view that national COMSEC policy interests are better served by a policy making committee.

g. Our premise is that sound national COMSEC policy must be a balanced reflection of civilian and DoD interests. That precept is not viable if the Secretary of Defense in his Executive Agent capacity has absolute power over the committee.

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Directive [REDACTED]

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administer a national asset which supports national  
[REDACTED] objectives at [REDACTED]  
locations around the world. [REDACTED] customers include  
civilian and military elements of the government, and  
we feel strongly that the managers and civilian users  
of such a system should have a strong voice in the  
formulation of the national COMSEC policies to which  
they will be bound.

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h. Recently we were informed that as a result  
of the DoD General Counsel review, the draft directive  
will be changed to recast the committee in its original  
role as an advisory body. Ultimately, the new draft will  
be submitted to the community for final comment. We  
will keep you advised of the issues involved and positions  
taken. [REDACTED]

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Attachments:

- 1 - Presidential Directive/NSC-24
- 2 - Chart of Proposed COMSEC Community Structure
- 3 - CIA Critique of National Security Communications  
Protection Committee Draft Directive
- 4 - Final Draft of National COMSEC Directive
- 5 - Information Memo to DCI
- 6 - Information Memo to DCI

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET DDA 79-0969

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Background Paper - National Communications Directive

FROM:

ADDA

EXTENSION

NO.

DD/A Registry

DATE

27 March

File Communication

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

Don,

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1. I can readily understand

[ ] concern but I don't think his position is a very strong one. Naturally we would prefer to be a full voting member of the policy formulation apparatus. In that way we can be certain that CIA views will be heard. However, I find it difficult to believe that the Secretary of Defense in the Executive Agent role would disregard a recommendation coming to him from the Security Committee (NCSC) which would include the same CIA views. It should also be noted that the Secretary of Defense is already the Executive Agent for the National Communications System and the Executive Agent for National cryptologic matters. I believe he has fulfilled these roles objectively and has not leaned excessively in the direction of DoI interests. I think he would carry out this additional Executive Agent role with similar objectivity. If not, we can always appeal his policy decisions through the DCI. I don't think this will happen very often.

2. In summary, I recommend that CIA continue to support its previous position in commenting on future drafts of the directive, but I would not recommend that we go to the mat if it is published in its current version - which OC objects to. I believe we can live with it without too much trouble.

Clifford D. May, Jr.

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DDADistribution:

15. Orig RS - D/CO w/Orig of DDA 79-0969w/oatts  
1-DDA Subj w/cy of atts

MAR 1979

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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Background Paper - National Communications Directive

FROM:

D/CO

EXTENSION

NO.

2C-M79-166

DATE

19 MAR 1979

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. DDA  
7D18 Hqs.

23 MAR 1979

*DL*

2. *DANNY MA*

3. *EO/DDA*

*Appreciate  
your news  
in this  
sensitive issue.  
DL*

23 MAR 1979